![]() One challenge is the difficulty of deterring hybrid threats in the “gray zone” short of war. ![]() While NATO’s flexible posture illustrates the proportionate and defensive nature of these measures, some studies point to the shortfalls of this model of “deterrence by reinforcement” and call for a more robust approach of “forward defense.” Studies of deterrence suggest being as specific as possible in linking military threats to unwanted behavior. NATO’s EFP deployments seek to deter in part by acting as “tripwires” that would trigger, in the event of aggression, a collective response with substantial follow-on forces. This dynamic also applies to the deterrent effect on Russia: too small may embolden, while too large may provoke. These deployments are requested by the host nations, who define the size and shape of the forces they host to reassure their own populations: too small and the effect is lost, too large and they might feel unduly threatened or lose confidence in their own government’s ability to keep them safe. Reassuring allies requires demonstrating both resolve and capability, so any new measures must signal both clear political support and sufficient military hardware. NATO’s presence in these frontline states reassures them other nations have its back-there are currently troops from 17 of the 30 NATO nations in the three Baltic states-and assures them of the sanctity of the Article 5 commitment to their collective defense. There are three likely strategic goals for NATO’s new battlegroups: reassurance, deterrence, and compellence.Īllies closer to Russia are more susceptible to hostile actions given their proximity and history. Short of changing facts on the ground through brute force, the utility of military presence is to support and create space for wider political and diplomatic efforts. ![]() ![]()
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